Taxation, Corruption and Punishment: A Game Equilibrium Model

OLIVIERO, A. CARBONI and PAOLO, RUSSU (2017) Taxation, Corruption and Punishment: A Game Equilibrium Model. In: Sixth International Conference on Advances in Social Science, Management and Human Behaviour - SMHB 2017, 09-10 December, 2017, Rome, Italy.

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This work examines the issue of tax evasion through underreporting activity. We assume that the decisions are described by an evolutionary dynamic process. The game considers that both citizens and officers can either ask for a bribe or be asked for it. The structure of the evasion-corruption game explicitly distinguishes between the probability to detect and punish a dishonest citizen ( ) and a dishonest officer ( ). These two parameters strongly characterize the game and be can considered as proxy of the efficacy of the institutional system and supply an interesting indication about the corruption and evasion behaviour in a certain country. We analyse the relationship between tax enasione and efficacy of the istitutional contry through the basins of attraction of the game strategies.

Item Type: Conference or Workshop Item (Paper)
Uncontrolled Keywords: evolutionary game, replicator dynamic, corruption model, bribery
Depositing User: Mr. John Steve
Date Deposited: 10 Mar 2019 09:20
Last Modified: 10 Mar 2019 09:20

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